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Mob justice is prevalent in South Africa and the only way these “mob justice” cases can 
be successfully prosecuted is through the application of the common purpose doctrine. It 
should be noted that such an important doctrine is under siege, yet it actually has a crucial 
role to play in “mob justice” murder cases. Therefore, the purpose of this dissertation is 
to defend the importance of having the common purpose doctrine in the South African 
criminal justice system, particularly in the context of “mob justice” murder cases. I will 
defend its importance by responding to some of the scathing criticisms of the doctrine 
that were advanced S v Thebus and Another 2003 (2) SACR 319 (CC), followed by writers 
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1.1. BACKGROUND: UNDERSTANDING MOB JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Crime is prevalent in South Africa,1 and the country’s crime rate is amongst the highest 
in the globe.2  Vigilantism and mob justice remains a significant societal scourge in South 
Africa and the world at large‚3 and is causing rampant deaths of persons accused of 
committing crimes. 
Mob justice in South Africa is known to be one of the ways of dealing with criminals in 
black townships.4 It is undeniably the most ferocious way in which a human being can be 
killed. This is usually done by stoning to death or severely assaulting the victim until they 
are unconscious. Others are killed by way of placing a tyre around their neck and setting 
them alight. This practice is commonly known as “necklacing”.5 
Such ruthlessness is contrary to the Constitution which highly upholds the right to human 
life.6 Only a few are fortunate enough to survive such brutal attacks. Every citizen in the 
Republic of South Africa needs to understand that there are laws that oversee every crime 
and therefore they should not resort to mob justice. Mob justice is not a solution but rather 
it affects the community in general, in a sense that the lives of the family of the victims 
are negatively affected especially in cases were the victim was a breadwinner.7 
                                                          
1 D L Kgosimore ‘Restorative justice as an alternative way of dealing with crime’ (2005) 15 (2) Acta Criminologica 
69. 
2 G Demombynes & B Ozler ‘Journal of Development Economics’ (2005) 76 (2) Crime and Local inequality in South 
Africa 265.  See also A Kriegler & M Shaw A Citizens Guide to Crime Trends in South Africa (2016) 1. 
3 S v Thebus and Another 2003 (2) SACR (CC) at para 34. 
4 D Sign ‘Resorting to community justice when State policing fails: South Africa’ (2005) 18 (3) Acta Criminologica 48. 
See also J R Martin ‘Vigilantism and Informal Social Control in South Africa’ (2010) 23(3) Acta Criminologica 53. 
5 S Kings ‘Khutsong : This is what happens to criminals here’ Mail & Guardian  online at 1, available at 
https://mg.co.za/article/2013-11-04-gangsters-silenced-in-khutsong,accessed on 4 November 2013. 
6  Section 11 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa‚1996. 
7 E Baloyi ‘The Christians Church’s role in the escalating mob justice system in our black townships- an African 
pastoral view: original research’ (2015) 71 HTS: Theological studies 2. 
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Everyone has the right to life and their right needs to be respected and protected8 
irrespective of whatever crime they might have committed‚ either enormous (such as 
murder) or trivial (such as cell phone- snatching).The most unfortunate part in mob justice 
violence is that sometimes innocent people are killed or assaulted in these violent 
attacks.9 Others are killed for trivial offences such as snatching handbags or stealing a 
loaf of bread. Such incidents are better off reported to the police instead of taking the law 
into one’s hands.10 
 Reports on Mob justice incidents  
It was once reported in KwaMhlanga, in Mpumalanga that a family of a man who was 
beaten to death by a furious mob demanded answers from the police‚ whom they said 
were not acting quick enough to arrest those who were responsible for the crime.11  
It was again reported in Bushbuckridge, in Mpumalanga that a man who was accused of 
killing a 14year old girl was killed in a mob justice violence, after evidence was found 
linking him to the death of the 14year old. The community members dragged the man to 
the scene were the body of the girl was found and burned him to death.12 
Another incident took place in the East Rand, were angry community members took the 
law into their own hands, after a group of men attempted to rob and rape a certain woman. 
The community caught nine of the men and burned them to death. The community 
members were quoted saying “in most cases these thugs did as the pleased, in certain 
                                                          
8 Note 5 above.  
9 T Makhetha  ‘Wrongly accused man’s mob justice ordeal’ IOL online 17 October 2014 ‚ 
http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/wrongly-accused-mans-mob-justice-ordeal-1767526, accessed on 20 
October 2014. 
10 Note 5 above. 
11 G Nicolaides &  V Abreu ‘Mob justice killing: Family want answers’  Eye Witness News available at 
http://mobi.iafrica.com/sa-news/2014/06/05/mob-justice-family-wants-answers/, accessed on 5 June 2014. 
12  Y Silaule ‘Murder suspect killed in mob justice attack’ News24 available at 




instances they raped woman in front of their husbands and children and if anybody 
intervened they were shot dead”.13 
In Protea Glen, in Soweto it was reported that the community members had kept four men 
who were accused of being criminals in hostage and assaulted them. One of the accused 
dead at the scene and three of his accomplice were in hospital after being assaulted by 
an angry mob.14 
The article entitled, “Free State community issues mob justice, burns two murder 
suspects” reported how two suspects were killed in retaliation for the role they were 
believed to have played in a murder that had taken place earlier that day. The initial victim 
in this case was robbed and killed on his way back home from a tavern. He died as a 
result of the wounds inflicted on him during the robbery. However, before he succumbed 
to the wounds the victim was able to identify the suspects that were involved in the 
robbery. The residents decided to pursue the alleged suspects, in which they initially 
caught up with two of the suspects and burned them to death. After killing them the 
residents went to the shacks were the suspects lived and burned them as well.15 
1.2.  THE ROLE OF THE COMMON PURPOSE DOCTRINE IN “MOB JUSTICE” 
MURDER CASES AND THE OBJECTIVE OF THE DISSERTATION. 
In many cases involving a consequence crime16 committed by a group of people, such as 
murder, it is often difficult, if not impossible to determine which offender caused the death 
of the victim. If a victim is beaten to death by a mob, it is often impossible to determine 
which of the offenders delivered the fatal blow. In cases of this nature, if the component 
of causation cannot be proved beyond any reasonable doubt all the accused would be 
                                                          
13 W Pretorious ‘Community ‘Burns nine thugs to death’ on East Rand’ News24 available at 
www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/community-burns-nine-thugs-to-death-on-east-rand-20151211 , accessed 11 
December 2015. 
14 M Raborife ‘Robber killed during violent mob attack’ News24 available at 
www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Robber-killed-during-violent-mob-attack-20150715 , accessed 15 July 2015. 
15 ‘Free-State community issues mob justice, burns two murder suspects’ available at 
http://www.sabreakingnews.co.za/2017/03/05/free-state-community-issues-mob-justice-burns-two-murder-
suspects/ , accessed 5 March 2017. 
16 G Kemp Criminal law in South Africa 2nd ed (2016) 74. A consequence crime is defined not in terms of what the 
accused did or failed to do, but rather in terms of the consequence that resulted from the accused conduct. Murder 
and culpable homicide are notable examples of consequence crimes. 
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acquitted. This is the injustice sought to be overcome through the introduction of the 
common purpose doctrine.17  
This special doctrine was introduced to overcome difficulties relating to causation in 
consequence crimes committed by collective individuals18 and it deliberately waives the 
causation prerequisite in consequence crimes in order to “facilitate the conviction of 
murder of each separate member of the group”.19 This dissertation seeks to defend the 
importance of having the common purpose doctrine in the South African criminal justice 
system‚ particularly in the context of “mob justice” murder cases. I will defend its 
importance by responding to some of the scathing criticisms of the doctrine that were 
advanced in Thebus, followed by writers such as Burchell, Grant, Rabie and Boister. 
The primary aim of the doctrine is to criminalize group misdemeanours and to satisfy the 
need to diminish crimes committed in the course of joint criminal ventures.20 This 
dissertation further seeks to illustrate that despite the negative controversies the common 
purpose doctrine attracted in the past, it is nonetheless a useful instrument in the South 
African criminal courts.21 
Reddi22 contends that in communities that are currently staggering from the negative  
impact caused by the widespread of serious crimes committed by collective individuals 
acting together‚ the common purpose doctrine is crucial to the eradication of the 
predominant threat posed by such criminals. It should be noted that such an important 
doctrine is under siege, yet it actually has a crucial role to play in mob justice murder 
cases. 
                                                          
17 S v Mzwempi 2011 (2) SACR 237 (ECM) at para 45. 
18 C R Snyman Criminal Law 6th ed (2014) 257. 
19 S v Thebus (note 3 above). See also Snyman (note 18 above,257).  
20  S v Thebus (note 3 above). 
21 The application of the common purpose doctrine has attracted severe criticisms since the decision in S v Safatsa 
1988 (1) SA 868 (A) and the majority judgment on S v Nzo 1990 (3) SA 1 (A). However, the application of the doctrine 
was affirmed in S v Thebus supra note 3 at 50. For commentary and summary of the foregoing cases see also J 
Burchell Principles of Criminal Law 5th ed (2016) 487- 489. 




It is further contended that the doctrine serves a greater good in deterring collective 
individuals acting together from taking the law into their hands and serves an essential 
role in cases of consequence crimes committed by collective individuals.23 Therefore, 
without the common purpose doctrine‚ collective  perpetrators of a crime would be beyond 
the reach of the criminal justice system irrespective of their unlawful and intentional 
participation in the commission of the crime.24 This state of affair will without doubt be 
parallel to the societal detest of crimes committed by collective individuals acting in 
concert.25 
 
1.3. Research Methodology  
The method of research used in this dissertation is largely analytical. It focuses on cases, 
journals, the Constitution and any other written material on the common purpose doctrine. 
The primary aim of my dissertation is to defend the importance of the role of the common 
purpose doctrine, particularly in “mob justice” murder cases. The discussion will entail the 
following structure:  
1.3.1. To elaborate further on how such an important doctrine is under siege, yet it 
actually has a crucial role to play in “mob justice” murder cases; 
1.3.2. To analyse cases where the common purpose doctrine was applied, particularly 
the Thebus case because that is where the scathing criticism of the doctrine of 
common purpose were first laid down before the court; and  
1.3.3. To defend the doctrine by responding to some of the scathing criticisms of the 
doctrine that were advanced in Thebus, followed by writers such as Burchell, 
Grant, Rabie and Boister. 
 
 
                                                          
23 S v Thebus (note 3 above). 
24 Snyman (note 18 above,256). See also S v Thebus supra note 3 at 40.  




THE COMMON PURPOSE DOCTRINE 
2.1. The development of the common purpose doctrine 
 
2.1.1 English Law 
The common purpose doctrine has its origin from English Law. The doctrine was defined 
and applied in the English law case of Macklin ‚Murphy,& Others’.26 The facts of the case 
were as follows: a crowd of prisoners assembled together and began rioting. The 
constables on duty intervened in order to disperse the crowd and apprehend the 
offenders. However, there was resistance from the mob and one of the constables was 
assaulted to death by the mob. A number of prisoners took part in the violence, some 
assaulting the constable with sticks and others by striking him with their fists. 
The court turned to consider the question whether the facts of the case give rise to the 
commission of manslaughter i.e–whether or not the participants intended to kill the 
constable.27 The court held that it was a principle of law that “if several persons act 
together in pursuance of a common intent‚ every act done in the furtherance of such intent 
by each of them is‚ in law‚ done by them all”.28 The participants we initially found guilty of 
manslaughter.29 
It is clear from the foregoing that the common purpose doctrine is based on a principle of 
imputation.30 According to the foregoing‚ actions are imputed to all the members in the 
joint unlawful enterprise who actively associate themselves with the actions of the other 
members in the joint unlawful enterprise. It is imperative to note that the principle of 
                                                          
26 (1838) 2 Lewin CC 225, 168 ER 1136. For a summary and commentary of this case, see J Burchell ‘Joint enterprise 
and common purpose: Perspective in English and South African criminal law’ South African Journal of Criminal 
Justice 1997 (10) 126. 
27 Ibid 126. 
28 Ibid 126. 
29 Ibid 126. 
30 M A Rabie ‘Doctrine of common purpose in Criminal Law’ (1971) 88 South African Law Journal 235. 
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imputation is extended even to a party who plays a relatively minor role during the 
commission of the crime.31 
The English law has always been concerned with intention (mens rea) rather than conduct 
(actus reus) of an accused in joint enterprise cases.32 In other words, the courts in 
determining criminal liability did not consider the element of actus reus, whether the 
accused actions physically brought about the death of the deceased, the main issue 
considered was whether the accused had the necessary intention (mens rea) at that 
moment to commit the crime in question. 
The following are examples of the foregoing: In R v Swindall Osborne33 the joint enterprise 
principle was formulated by Lord Chief Baron Pallock as follows :  
“If each of the two persons be driving a cart at a dangerous and furious rate, and they be inciting 
each other to drive at a dangerous and furious rate along a turnpike road, and one of the carts run 
over a man and kill him, each of the two persons is guilty of manslaughter, and it is no ground of 
defence, that the death was partly caused by the negligence of the deceased himself, or that he 
was either deaf or drunk at the time”. 
In Chan Wing-Siu v The Queen 34 the court held that if X and Y agree to commit an offence 
(crime A) and in the course of the joint unlawful venture one of them X  commits another 
offence (crime B) which they did not agree to commit. Y in this case will be found guilty 
as an accessory to crime B if he foresaw the possibility that his partner in crime X might 
act as he did. 
In R. v. Derek Bentley (deceased)35 the appellant (aged 19) together with his accomplice 
(aged 16) committed an offence of burglary attempt (crime A). During the execution of the 
offence, the appellant’s friend and accomplice (Christopher Craig) shot and murdered 
                                                          
31 Kemp (note 16 above, 263). See also the discussion on this point in S v Safatsa supra note 21 at 892c-d and R v 
Mbande and others 1933 AD 382. 
32 Burchell (note 26 above, 128).  
33 1846 2 CAR. & K.230. 
34 1985 1 AC 168 (PC) at 175F-G. See also Burchell (note 26 above, 129). 
35 1998 EWCA Crim 2516. For summary and commentary of the case see Dr Robert N Moles and B Sangha 
‘Networked Knowledge-Law Report R.v.Derek Bentley (Deceased) [1998] EWCA Crim 2516’ Accessed 30 July 1998. 
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(crime B) a police constable. Bentley was convicted as a party to the murder in terms of 
the English law principle of joint enterprise.  
R v Rook36 the court held that in a case of a joint enterprise where both parties happen 
to be present at the scene of the crime, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that a secondary party who assisted or encouraged before the 
commission of crime possessed the necessary intention to kill the victim. Provided it was 
proved that he reasonably foresaw the event as a real or substantial risk but nonetheless 
doubted its occurrence. 
 
2.1.2. South African law 
The common purpose doctrine was introduced into South Africa through the Native 
Territories Penal Code,37 which was the first legislation which incorporated the common 
purpose doctrine in South Africa. Section 78 of the Act provides that: 
“If several persons form a common intention to prosecute any unlawful purpose‚ and to 
assist each other therein‚ each of them is a party to every offence committed by any one 
of them in the prosecution of such common purpose‚ the commission of which offence 
was‚ or ought to have been‚ known to be a probable consequence of the prosecution of 
such common purpose”.38  
From then‚ the South African courts like those in England interpreted the doctrine to apply 
to all members of a crowd who either agree or actively associate themselves with the 
criminal conduct committed by one member of the crowd. However, if they are not 
involved at all in the committing the crime, then they are not guilty of any crime. 
                                                          
36 1997 Cr. App. R .327. 
37 Native Territories Penal Code section 78 of Act 24 of 1886 (C), in which see Rabie (note 30 above, 229) and Hefer 
JA in S v Nzo supra note 21 at 14 E-F. 
38 Section 78 of Act 24 of 1886 at 2135.  
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R v Garnsworthy39 was one of the early cases in which the common purpose doctrine 
was applied in the context of South Africa‚ where it was formulated as follows: 
“where two or more combine in an undertaking or an illegal purpose each of them is liable 
for anything done by the other or others of the combination in the furtherance of their 
object if what was done was what they knew or ought to have known ‚ would be a probable 
result of their endeavouring to achieve their object”.40 
The above formulation is said to have laid down the premise in which criminal liability 
based on common purpose may emerge. The South African common law of criminal 
liability recognizes four requirements for criminal liability namely‚ (i) an act (actus reus) ‚ 
(ii) which is unlawful (unlawfulness) ‚ (iii) causing the crime (causation)‚ and (iv) committed 
with necessary intent or culpa (mens rea).41 From the foregoing a person may only be 
criminally liable for his or her own criminal conduct, there should be a causal connection 
between the accused’s conduct and the criminal outcome.42 However‚ since the South 
African law has adopted the common purpose doctrine‚ the causation requirement is 
excluded if the common purpose doctrine is applied.43  
When the doctrine is applied, an accused person may still be found guilty of an offence 
in the absence of proof of a causal link between his or her conduct and the criminal result 
provided the State proves that a common purpose existed amongst the accused person 
and the other members in the common purpose.44 The South African law of common 
purpose regards the participants in the common purpose all as co-perpetrators by virtue 
of a principle of imputing the actions of the actual perpetrator to all the other participants 
                                                          
39 1923 WLD 17.  
40 Ibid 19. 
41 C R Snyman Criminal Law 5th ed (2008) 29-33. See also S v Mzwempi supra note 17 at 44.  
42 Kemp (note 16 above, 258). 
43 Burchell (note 21 above,477). 
44 Kemp (note 16 above, 261). The following are examples of cases in which the Appellate Division held convictions 
of murder on the basis of the common purpose‚ where no causal connection was proved between the conduct of 
the accused and the death of the deceased ‚R v Dlala and Others 1962 (1) SA 307 (A)‚ S v Malinga 1963 (1) SA 692 
(A)  and S v Madlala 1969 (2) SA 637 (A), S v Mgxwiti 1954 (1) SA 370 (A), S v Khoza 1982 (3) SA 1019 (A), S v 
Daniels 1983 (3) SA 275 (A), S v Nkwenja 1985 (2) SA 560 (A) and R v Sikepe 1946 AD 745.  
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acting together in the joint unlawful venture.45 It is for this reason that the requirement for 
causation under common purpose is believed to be replaced by the principle of imputation 
in order to fill in the gap created by the concept.46 It is essential to note that it is only 
conduct which is imputed and not intention under common purpose.47 Therefore, to be 
convicted of murder, each individual accused should be proved to have had the intention 
in the form of (direct, indirect or dolus eventualis) to kill.48 
Currently as it stands the principle underlying common purpose is as follows: 
“where two or more people agree to commit a crime or actively associate in a joint unlawful enterprise‚ each 
will be responsible for specific criminal conduct committed by one of their number which falls within their 
common design”.49 
Common purpose may arise in two forms, either by prior agreement or active 
association.50 In the context of this dissertation prior agreement may arise in the following 
manner: where a crowd of angry community members assemble at a community hall and 
agree to riot to Y’s house who is believed to have raped and killed a student, and in the 
event  Y is attacked by the mob with fists and others severely assault him until he dies 
from the fatal wounds inflicted on him. It is essential to note that where prior agreement 
                                                          
45 Snyman (note 18 above, 258). See also S v Malinga supra note 44 at 695A-B, were the judge held that “as far as 
individual mens rea is concerned, the shot fired by accused no 4 was, in effect, also the shot of each of the 
appellants”. 
46 N P Makiwane The Nature of Association and Dissociation for Common Purpose Liability (published LLM Thesis, 
University of South Africa, 1999) 4. 
47 M C Mare ‘The doctrine of common purpose in South African law’ at 122 available at 
uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/handle 113-133, accessed 24 October 2016. In S v Nkwenja supra, the majority court held 
that “the critical moment to assess the mens rea of a participant in a common purpose is when the common 
purpose is formulated, and not when the unlawful act is committed”. 
48 Ibid 122. 
49 Burchell (note 21 above, 477). See also Rabie (note 30 above, 233). See also S v Mitchell and Another 1992 (1) 
SACR 17 (A) were Nestadft J A set aside Y’s conviction of murder on the basis that he did not foresee the manner in 
which the deceased died (X’s criminal conduct did not fall within the scope of their common design). The facts of the 
case were as follows:  the appellants and two others were returning from a resort when they stopped at the café for 
food and cigarettes. Before they returned to their vehicle the two appellants and two others agreed to throw stones 
at pedestrians from the back of the vehicle. While they were collecting the stones X (appellant no1) also picked up 
a paving brick. After they resumed their journey, X stood up and throw the brick to a group of pedestrians which 
struck one of the pedestrians on his head and killed him.  X was convicted of murder. Y (appellant no2) was found 
by the trial court to have been a party to a common purpose to kill and was also convicted of murder.  Y appealed 
against his conviction and the Appellant Division found that the trial court had erred in its application of the common 
purpose. At the end of the trial Y’s conviction of murder was set aside. See also S v Goosen 1989 (4) SA 1013 (A). 
50 Burchell (note 21 above, 477). 
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is proved, the accused does not need to be present at the scene of the crime and neither 
is he required to have physically participated in the commission of the crime.51 However, 
the actions imputed to him must fall within the common design and he must be proved to 
have possessed the necessary mens rea (either direct or dolus eventualis).52 
Active association is a far wider concept than prior agreement.53 In the absence of prove 
of prior agreement an accused person may be found guilty of the crime by virtue of active 
association.54 It is imperative to note that the accused association with the other members 
in the common cause must take place before the commission of the crime and the 
accused must still be a party to the common cause at the time the crime is committed.55 
Mere presence at the scene of the crime does not automatically amount to criminal liability 
under the doctrine.56 A fundamental distinction should be drawn between those that are 
merely standing and witnessing the mob ordeal and those participating in the commission 
of the crime. The prosecution has the duty to establish beyond reasonable doubt that 
each participant had the necessary criminal capacity and fault element at the time of the 
act of association.57 Sisilana58 argues that thoughts or wicked thoughts are not legally 
punishable as the law requires that the accused must have had the necessary intention 
and must have shown common purpose by performing some kind of overt conduct  to 
show solidarity with the others. For instance , in a mob attack such an overt conduct would 
                                                          
51 Snyman (note 18 above, 260-261). See also S v Motaung 1961 (2) SA 209 (A) and S v Mgxwiti supra.  In S v Yelani 
1989 (2) SA 43 (A), accused no6 was held liable by the court a quo although he was never present at the second 
meeting nor at the scene of the crime. 
52  S v Mzwempi supra note 17 at paras 20 and 21. 
53 Snyman (note 18 above,559). 
54 S v Mgedezi and Others 1989 (1) SA 687 (A) at 705I-706C. 
55 Kemp (note 16 above,263). 
56 S v Mgedezi supra note 54 at 702H-I and 703. See also N A Matzukis ‘The Nature and scope of common purpose’ 
1988 South African Journal of Criminal Justice (2) 233. Matzukis gave an example of a mere presence at the scene 
using the following scenario: where a crowd with a clear intent of killing Y and X joins it, not because he desires to 
associate himself with the criminal conduct of the crowd, but because of curiosity avails himself to witness the 
impending murder. X would not be found guilty of murder because his overt conduct does not show solidarity with 
the acts of the crowd.  
57 Burchell (note 21 above,477). See also D Unterhalter ‘The Doctrine of Common Purpose: What Makes One 
Person Liable for the Acts of Others?’ (1988) 105 South African Law of Journal 676, Unterhalter states that “a 
person may participate in a joint enterprise as a leading actor and yet not cause the death of the deceased”. 
58 L Sisilana ‘What’s wrong with the common purpose’ (1999) 12 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 302. 
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be shown by uttering words of encouragement to the other members of the mob to kill or 
burn the victim59 or standing by ready to give assistance if required.60  
The case of S v Safatsa61  commonly known as the “Sharpeville Six case” remains for all 
the wrong reasons‚ the landmark case in which common purpose by active association 
was applied in the context of South Africa. The notable realties of the event were as 
follows‚ on the 3 of September 1984 a large crowd of about hundred people assaulted 
the deputy mayor of the town council of Lekoa‚ by throwing stones at him‚ dragging him 
to the street‚ pouring petrol and setting him alight. He died on the spot due to the wounds 
inflicted on him. Eight out of hundred people were charged with murder of the deputy 
mayor.62 
This is how the court applied the common purpose doctrine to determine liability of each 
of the eight accused at the trial court: Accused number 1, had grabbed the deceased, 
wrestled with him for possession of his pistol, and also throw the first stone which struck 
the deceased on his head.63 Accused number 2, had stoned the deceased’s house and 
also throw a stone at the deceased which stuck him on his back. Accused number 3, had 
grabbed the deceased and wrestled with him for possession of his pistol in which he 
succeeded.64 
Accused number 4, had been part of the crowd which converged at the deceased’s house. 
She shouted repeated exhortations to the crowd to “kill the deceased because he had 
fired on them” this was after the deceased fired a shot which struck one of the members 
in the crowd and she had also slapped a woman in the face who remonstrated the crowd 
not to burn the deceased.65 
Accused number 5 & 6‚ had been part of the forefronts of the crowd which had converged 
at the deceased’s house and vandalised it, although they were not themselves seen to 
                                                          
59 See S v Safatsa (note 21 above) for example, the conduct of the fourth accused who altered words of 
encouragement to her follow members to kill the victim. 
60 Kemp (note 16 above,263). 
61 Note 21 above. 
62 S v Safatsa supra note 21 at 871B-F. 
63 S v Safatsa supra note 21 at 890D. 
64 S v Safatsa supra note 21 at 891C-D. 
65 S v Safatsa supra note 21 at 892C-D. 
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have thrown stones. Accused number 7, had made petrol bombs, set the deceased’s 
house alight and pushed the deceased’s car into the street, and setting it alight. Accused 
number 8, also made petrol bombs and handed them out with instructions. He 
commanded the mob to set the deceased’s house on fire and assisted in pushing the car 
onto the street.66 
At the end of the trial, all accused were found guilty of murder except for accused number 
5 and 6 who were said not to have had the necessary intention to kill at the time.67 It is 
submitted from the above facts that, the six accused the “Sharpeville Six” were found 
guilty of murder on the basis of their “overt conduct”. Whiting68 in giving an example of 
such an overt conduct pointed out that “it would be to join a crowd with an obvious 
intention to act or show solidarity with the person who actually acts”. 
Furthermore, Botha JA in S v Safatsa69 managed to answer the question whether it is 
possible for a participant in the common purpose to be found guilty of murder in the 
absence of proof that his conduct contributed causally to the death of the deceased? He 
concluded that a party to a common purpose can be convicted of murder in the absence 
of proof of a causal connection between his conduct and the deceased.70 It is now trite 
law that the element of causation is not a prerequisite under the common purpose 
doctrine.71 
Another landmark case on active association was the case of S v Singo72 the factual 
background of the case were as follows: the appellant formed part of the mob that 
attacked and killed an old woman in the belief that she had bewitched a certain young 
girl. After having stoned the woman‚ the appellant was himself injured‚ and according to 
his testimony at the trial court ,he  left the scene because he was worried about the injury 
                                                          
66 S v Safatsa supra note 21 at 892G-J. 
67 S v Safatsa supra note 21 at 893F-G were Botha JA stated that “all these accused had actively associated 
themselves with the conduct of the mob which directed the killing of the deceased”. 
68 R Whiting ‘Joining-in’ (1986) South African Law Journal 39. 
69 S v Safatsa (note 21 above). 
70 S v Safatsa supra note 21 at 900H. 
71 Ibid 900H. 
72 1993 (2) SA 765 (A). 
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he sustained on his shoulder during the attack.73 The trial court found that the appellant 
shared the common intent to kill the deceased with the other members in the common 
purpose and that he had actively associated himself with the mob in executing this intent. 
The trial court subsequently found the appellant guilty of murder. However, the appellant 
was granted leave to appeal against his conviction by the Supreme Court of Appeal in 
which he succeeded.74 
The application of the common purpose doctrine in its active association form has not 
been without controversy since its application in the “Sharpeville Six decision”.75 However 
Botha JA‚ in S v Mgedezi76 managed to limit the scope of active association by laying 
down the following prerequisites which should all be met before a person could be found 
criminally liable on the basis of active association in the absence of prior agreement. The 
requirements are as follows:  
“(i) the accused must have been present at the scene of the violence‚ (ii) must have been aware of 
the assault on the deceased‚ (iii) must have had the intention to make common cause with those 
committing the assault‚ (iv) there must have been a manifestation by the accused of a sharing of a 
common purpose by himself performing an act of association with the conduct of the others and (v) 
he must have being in possession of the requisite mens rea”.77 
It is important to note that if in any event one of these prerequisites is not met, the accused 
will be acquitted.78 Furthermore‚ although the scope of active association has been limited 
by Botha JA in S v Mgedezi79 the facts in S v Nzo80 illustrate an unreasonable extension 
                                                          
73 S v Singo supra note 72 at 769F-G. 
74 Ibid 769F-G. 
75 J Burchell ‘Criminal Law: Strafreg S v Nzo 1990 (3) SA 1 (A) – Common-purpose liability’ South African Journal of 
Criminal Justice 1990 349. These controversies can be traced back to the case of S v Thomo 1969 (1) SA 385 (A), S v 
Williams 1980 (1) SA 60 (A) and S v Maxaba 1981 (1) SA 1148 (A). 
76 S v Mgedezi (note 54 above). The factual background of the case we’re as follows: the case arose from an unrest 
in the mine compound where tension had been flowing between the mineworkers and their team leaders who they 
regarded as informers. On the fatal night a group of mineworkers armed with weapons marauded the compound 
singing song of execution of their leaders. During the attack on a room shared by the team leaders, their beds were 
overturned, windows were broken, the door was torn down and the room was set alight. As a result of the attack, 
four of the team leaders died and the other two managed to escape. Further note that following Mgedezi the 
application of these requirements had influenced the decisions of various Appellate Divisions such as S v Petersen 
1989 (3) SA 420 (A), S v Yelani supra, S v Motaung supra, S v Khumalo 1991 (4) SA 310 (A) and S v Singo supra. 
77 S v Mgedezi (note 54 above). 
78 Ibid 705I-706C. See also S v Mzwempi supra note 17 at paras 13-36 and also paras 119-128. 
79 S v Mgedezi (note 54 above). 
80 Note 21 above. 
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of the application of these prerequisites of active association. The salient facts of the case 
were as follows: The first appellant was a leader of a group of the African National 
Congress (ANC) in Port Elizabeth. The second appellant ‚ was a member of the ANC who 
arranged for accommodation for ANC members for the storage of arms and explosives. 
Mrs T‚ the wife of another member of the ANC had threatened to report her husband of 
harbouring an ANC member. The threat was overheard by the first appellant who reported 
it to one Joe‚ also a member of the ANC. Joe warned Mrs T that he would kill her if she 
carried out her threat and three weeks later‚ on 8 May 1983 Joe murdered Mrs T. The 
first and second appellant’s were subsequently charged with the murder of Mrs T‚ while 
Joe who initially committed the crime managed to escape to Lesotho and was never 
brought the justice.81 
On appeal, counsel for the appellant did not challenge the trial court’s finding that he 
foresaw the possibility of Mrs T’s death. The essence of the appeal was whether the 
appellants had “associated themselves with and persisted in the furtherance of the 
common purpose”.82 
Hefer JA‚ held that the first appellant’s conviction should be set aside for murder based 
on the fact that ‚ the appellant had effectively dissociated himself from the common 
purpose before the murder of Mrs T by voluntarily giving evidence to the police about his 
involvement in the ANC. The second appellant’s conviction of murder was therefore 
confirmed by the Appellant Division.83 
It is paramount to note that the second appellant was convicted of murder despite any 
evidence placing him at the scene of the crime where Joe killed the deceased. 
Furthermore‚ there was no sufficient evidence on the part of the second appellant to make 
“common cause with those who were actually perpetrating the assault” and there was no 
manifestation of sharing of a common purpose with the perpetrator (Joe) of the murder 
                                                          
81 S v Nzo supra note 21 at 1E -2A. 
82 S v Nzo supra note 21 at 6F. 
83 S v Nzo supra note 21 at 10F-G. 
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by performing “some act of association” with the conduct of the murderer.  The extension 
of the doctrine in this case was too broad.84 
 
2.2. Accomplice and “joiner- in” liability 
Accomplice liability is often confused with common purpose liability. Snyman85 defines  
an accomplice as ‚ a person who unlawfully and intentionally furthers a crime committed 
by somebody else (the perpetrator) by for example giving the latter advice or assisting 
them to commit the crime . 
To determine if a person’s actions constitute accomplice liability the following 
prerequisites should be met: 
(i) Accessory nature of liability – an accomplice’s liability is of accessory or 
dependent nature. For an accused to be liable as an accomplice somebody 
else has to be liable as a perpetrator. The crime must have been committed by 
X before Y can be regarded as an accomplice.86 
(ii) Act of omission which furthers the crime - in order to be liable as an accomplice‚ 
Y must commit an act which amounts to a furthering of the crime committed by 
X. Y may further or promote the commission of the crime by ‚ for instance‚ 
facilitating‚ encouraging‚ giving advice‚ order the crime to be committed or 
assisting Y to dispose the body.87 
(iii) Unlawfulness - The act of furthering must be unlawful and there must be no 
ground of justification for the act.88 
(iv) Intention - to be liable as an accomplice Y must intentionally further the 
commission of the crime committed by X.89 
                                                          
84 S v Nzo supra note 21 at 12F. 
85 Snyman (note 18 above,266). See also Kemp (note 16 above, 273-277) and Burchell (note 21 above, 505-513) for 
the definition of accomplice liability. 
86 Snyman (note 18 above‚ 266). See also S v Williams supra note 75 at 63 and S v Maxaba supra. 
87 Snyman (note 18 above‚ 267). See also S v Msomi 2010 2 SACR 173 (KZP) and see also S v Williams supra note 75 
at 63B-C. 
88 Snyman (note 18 above‚ 268). 
89 Snyman (note 18 above‚269). See also S v Tshwape and Another 1964 4 SA 327 (C) 333.  
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Furthermore‚ Joubert JA in S v Williams90 gave a clear distinction between a perpetrator 
and an accomplice in the following words: 
“An accomplice’s liability is accessory in nature so that there can be no question of an accomplice 
without a perpetrator or co-perpetrator who commits the crime. A perpetrator complies with all the 
requirements of the definition of the relevant crime. Where co-perpetrators commit the crime in 
concert‚ each co-perpetrator complies with the requirements of the definition of the relevant crime. 
On the other hand‚ an accomplice is not a perpetrator or co-perpetrator‚ since he lacks the actus 
reus of the perpetrator. An accomplice associates himself wittingly with the commission of the crime 
by the perpetrator or co-perpetrator in that he knowingly affords the perpetrator or co-perpetrator 
the opportunity‚ the means or the information which furthers the commission of the crime… 
[A]ccording to general principles there must be a causal connection between the accomplice’s 
assistance and the commission of the crime by the perpetrator or co-perpetrator. He is …liable as 
an accomplice to murder on the ground of his own act‚ either positive act or an omission ‚ to further 
the commission of the murder, and his own fault‚ viz the intent that the victim must be killed‚ coupled 
with the act (actus reus) of the perpetrator or co-perpetrator to kill the victim unlawfully”.91 
The question whether a person who subsequently makes common cause with others by 
joining-in an attack while it is still commencing will afford a sufficient basis for holding him 
liable in addition to the others for the murder of the victim, is one to contemplate when 
challenged with the question of a “joiner-in”.92 
In the context of this dissertation, a person will be regarded as a “joiner-in” in a mob 
violence if a joins a crowd of about fifty people who were acting with a common purpose 
and who have already wounded X. Thereafter, while X is still alive Y who had not 
                                                          
90 Note 75 above.  
91 Ibid 63A-F. 
92 Whiting (note 68 above, 41). R v Mtembu 1950 (1) SA 670 (A) at 686-7, was the first case in which the question 
was considered by Murray AJA who was one of the majority judges, and Greenburg JA, dissenting, both rejected 
the idea that in this situation a person who joins in would be liable for murder. Followed by the case of S v Mgxwiti  
supra note 44 at 382D-E,were Schrenier JA was of the view that a joiner-in should be guilty of murder when he 
held that: “But where an accused person has joined a murderous assault upon one who is then alive but who dies 
as a result of the assault, it seems to me that no good reason exists why the accused should be guilty of murder if at 
the time he joined in the assault the victim, though perhaps grievously hurt, was not yet mortally injured, but 
should not be guilty if the injuries already received a the time can properly be described as mortal or fatal”. See also 
R v Dlala (note 44 above) 
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previously agreed with the other members to kill X, arrives at the scene and inflicts an 
injury to X, which however does not hasten his death. Thereafter X dies as a result of the 
wounds inflicted on him by the crowd. In this circumstances, Y will be equally liable with 
the others as a “joiner-in”.93 However, the following requirements have to be considered 
in order to establish whether the “joining-in” in the mob violence amounts to murder or 
attempted murder:  
(i) if the injuries inflicted by Y in fact hastened X ’s death, there can be no doubt that there 
is a causal link between Y ‘s acts and X’s death and that Y is therefore guilty of murder.(ii) 
if Y’s assault on X takes place after X has already died from the injuries inflicted by the 
crowd or his partners in crime, it is similarly beyond reasonable doubt that Y cannot be 
convicted in respect of a corpse.(iii) if the evidence reveals a previous conspiracy 
between the crowd and Y to kill X, Y will be guilty of murder by virtue of the of  the common 
purpose doctrine, since ‘the crowds act in fatally wounding X is then imputed to Y. The 
“joining-in” situation presupposes the absence of a common purpose between the crowd 
and Y.94 
Furthermore, it was in the case of S v Motaung95 were the question whether a joiner-in is 
liable as an accomplice or as a perpetrator was settled. The court held that “a joiner-in 
after the fatal wound has been inflicted should be liable for attempted murder, while the 
person who joins the attack before the mortal wound has been inflicted should be 
convicted of murder”.96 
 
2.3 Dissociation from the common purpose 
If a party to a common purpose changes his or her mind before the commission of the 
crime, such a dissociation from the common purpose warrants as a valid defence for 
escaping liability.97 For example, if a crowd of people severely assault Y in the belief that 
                                                          
93 Snyman (note 18 above,264). 
94 For full explanation of the characteristics of a “joining –in” see Snyman (note 18 above,265).  
95 Note 51 above. 
96 S v Motaung supra note 51 at 520F-G. 
97 Kemp (note 16 above,264). 
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he had raped a ten year old girl and during the assault X who along with other members 
of the mob attack Y with a fist. Thereafter‚ X disappears from the scene of the crime before 
the victim receives the fatal wounds. X’s disappearance in this regard from the scene 
before the death of the victim‚ can in these circumstances be regarded as a form of 
“dissociation” from the common purpose, provided the necessary requirements are met. 
Snyman98 provides that it is however not just any kind of withdrawal from the common 
cause which has the effect of negating liability. He further recommends that the following 
requirements should be used to determine whether a particular individual’s conduct 
constitute an effective dissociation: 
“(i) in order for X to escape conviction on the ground of a withdrawal from the common purpose, X 
must have the clear and unambiguous intention to withdraw from such purpose.99 (ii) in order to 
succeed with a defence of withdrawal X‚ must perform some positive act of withdrawal.100 (iii) the 
withdrawal must be voluntary.101 (iv) the withdrawal will amount to a defence only if it takes place 
before the course of event has reached what may be called ‘commencement of the execution’.102 
(v)The type of act required for an effective withdrawal depends upon a number of circumstances.103 
(vi) The role played by X in devising the plan to commit the crime has a strong influence on the 
                                                          
98 Snyman (note 18 above, 263-264). See for example the following cases, S v Tshitwamulomoni (unreported) 2 
November 1990 (VSC), involved a mob killing of an old woman accused of being a witch. Singo, one of the accused, 
alleged that after he had thrown two stones at the deceased, of which one of the stones struck the deceased, he 
was in the event injured after he was struck hard on his shoulder with a stick and decided to leave the scene because 
he was worried about the injury he sustained on his shoulder during the attack. The court linked his position to ‘a 
man who actively associates in the execution of the common cause and at the stage when becoming out of breath 
or becoming tired stops actively participating just for that reason, but not because he mentally wanted to dissociate 
himself from the actions of the other perpetrators whose actions are also regarded to be his’ (at para 17). He was 
accordingly convicted of murder on the basis of common purpose. In S v Ramadzhana (unreported) 13 May 1991 
(Case No CC 27/90) (V), a traditional healer was killed by a mob. The accused in accordance with a prior agreement 
went along with the mob to the deceased’s kraal. The accused confessed that when the deceased fled his kraal, he 
ran after him. In the event, when the deceased was struck by an axe on his back, the accused joined in the assault 
on the deceased by delivering two blows on his back with a piece of wood. The medical evidence indicated that the 
axe-blow was not the fatal blow which contributed to the death of the deceased. The attack on the deceased 
continued with the other members of the mob by striking the deceased with further blows on his head with an axe 
and panga. When the other members began chopping the deceased on his head, the accused found it repulsive and 
left the scene of the crime. The court held that the fatal injury was inflicted only after the accused had let the scene. 
However, despite the absence of evidence beyond any reasonable doubt the court concluded that the accused could 
only have turned away shortly before the fatal injury were inflicted. 
99 See for example S v Singo supra note 72 at 772H-I.  
100 See for example S v Nomakhlala 1990(1) SACR 300 (A) at 304A. 
101 See for example Nzo supra note 21 at 10‚ S v Musingadi 2005 1 SACR 395 (SCA) 408I-J ‚ S v Lungile 1999 2 SACR 
597 (SCA) 603G-H and S v Beahan 1992 1 SACR 307 (ZS) 322A-B. 
102 S v Ndebu 1986 2 SA 133 (ZS) at 137A-D. 
103 See Beahan supra note 101 at 322D ‚R v Chinyere 1980 (2) SA 576 (RAD) 579G-H and Singo supra note 72 at 772. 
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type of conduct which the law requires him to perform in order to succeed with a defence of 
withdrawal”.104 
From the suggested requirements above ‚it is vital to note that when applying these 
requirements‚ what may constitute a viable withdrawal from the common purpose in one 
case‚ might not constitute a viable withdrawal in another case.105 
For instance‚ in S v Ndebu106 the two appellant acting in concert went together at night 
with an intention of housebreaking. The first appellant had a gun and the second appellant 
was aware of it. Since they were to engage in a housebreaking‚ the second appellant 
knew that the gun would have to be utilized at some point and he did not care whether 
the fatal consequence would occur or not. 
When they entered the house a certain woman saw them and screamed. The man of the 
house came and approached the first appellant who shot and killed him. The second 
appellant testified that he fled the scene as soon as he heard the woman scream and was 
outside the gate when he heard the gunshot. The main question arising from these facts 
was whether this last-minute withdrawal on the part of the second appellant amounted to 
an effective dissociation from the common purpose? The court concluded that his last 
minute flight from the scene did not amount to a dissociation.107 
The court based its judgment on the fact that the appellant knew and appreciated the risk 
that if someone in the house confronted them the firearm might be used to effect an 
escape. In other words‚ he subjectively foresaw the possibility of his socius (partner in 
crime) using the gun at some point during the housebreaking if they were to be 
confronted.108 The court further held that had the second appellant disarmed or 
persuaded his companion or protected the household in some way, his dissociation would 
be upheld. For instance, if the second appellant showed a positive act by trying to stop 
                                                          
104 See Musingadi supra note 101 at 409G-I‚ S v Nomakhlala supra note 100 at 304‚ Singo supra and S v Nduli 1993 
2 SACR 501 (A) 504E-F. 
105 Snyman (note 18 above,264). 
106 Note 102 above. For summary and commentary of the case see D R Khuluse ‘Dissociation from common 
purpose’ SACR (1992) 2 SAS 173-175. 
107 Ibid 173-175. 
108 S v Ndebu supra note 102 at 137D-H. 
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his companion or assist the householders to escape, such actions might have amounted 
to dissociation.109 
In R v Chinyerere110 contrary to the case of Ndebu supra the court in this case held that 
a last minute withdrawal from common purpose amounted to a dissociation. The appellant 
in this case was part of a gang and was present at the scene when the door of the shop 
was broken by his fellow gang members but he was frightened and decided to leave. He 
did not at any point enter the shop and participate in the physical removal of the goods. 
Lewis JP‚ held that “a conspirator can withdraw from the enterprise even at the last 
moment and in the event of his withdrawal he is entitled to his acquittal on the main charge 
and is liable to be convicted only of the offence of conspiring to commit the crime in 
question”.111 In other words, the appellant in this case would be acquitted for theft‚ but will 
be liable for conspiracy. 
From the two foregoing cases‚ it is evident that it is not any fleeing from the scene of the 
crime that amounts to a viable dissociation. In the case of R v Chinyerere112 the last-
minute dissociation from the scene was regarded as effective dissociation‚ while in S v 
Ndebu113 the last-minute dissociation from the scene was not regarded as effective 
dissociation. 
In S v Nzo114 the dissociation of one of the appellant from the common purpose 
succeeded on the basis that he dissociated himself before the “commencement of the 
execution” of the crime and his act of dissociation was voluntary.115 
Another case that dealt with a dissociation from a common purpose was S v Singo116 the 
appellate division in this case was faced with the question “whether the appellant’s  
                                                          
109 Khuluse (note 106 above, 179).  
110 Note 103 above. For summary and commentary on the case see Khuluse (note 106 above, 175 and 176). 
111 R v Chinyerere supra note 103 at 579F-G. 
112 R v Chinyerere (note 103 above). 
113 S v Ndebu (note 102 above). 
114 S v Nzo (note 21 above). 
115 L Hales ‘Effective dissociation from a common purpose-a Zimbabwean view’ 1992 SACJ 188. Hales‚ stated that 
where the accused person has dissociated himself ‚ he cannot be held responsible for offences committed after his 
withdrawal provided his disassociation was “effective”. 
116 S v Singo (note 72 above). 
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discontinuance of participation in the assault on the deceased amounted to a dissociation 
from the common purpose to kill”.117 The court (per Grosskopf JA) stated that : 
“If these two requirements (active association and intention) are necessary for the creation of 
liability on the ground of common purpose, it would seem to follow that liability would only continue 
while both requirements remain satisfied or, conversely, that the liability would cease when either 
requirement is no longer. From practical a point of view, however, it is difficult to imagine situations 
in which a participant would be able to escape liability on the grounds that he had ceased his active 
association with the offence while his intent to participate remained undiminished. One must 
postulate an initial active association to make him a participant in the common purpose in the first 
place. If he then desists actively participating whilst still retaining his intent to commit the 
substantive offence in conjunction with others, the result will normally be that his initial actions 
would constitute sufficient active association with the attainment of the common purpose to render 
him liable even for the conduct of others committed after he had desisted. This would cover the 
case,…, of a person who, tiring of the assault, lags behind or stands aside and allows others to 
take over. Clearly he would continue to be liable. However, where the participant not only desists 
from actively participating, but also abandons his intention to commit the offence, he can in principle 
not be liable for any acts committed by others after his change of heart. He no longer satisfies the 
requirements of liability on the grounds of common purpose”.118 
 
At the end of the trial ‚ the appellant was found to have effectively dissociated himself 
from the conduct of the crowd before the deceased received the fatal wounds.119 The 
conviction of murder was therefore set aside and replaced with a conviction for attempted 
murder. 
In S v Nomakhlala120 X and Y were convicted of the murder of Z. X was asked by his 
fellow group members to drive a car in which Z was upheld by his fellow group members, 
to a place described as a  rugby field. X was instructed to stab Z with a knife, but he 
refused and immediately withdrew from the scene. The trial court subsequently found X 
and Y guilty of murder. Thereafter, X and Y appealed against their convictions of murder. 
                                                          
117 S v Singo supra note 72 at 770F-G. 
118 S v Singo supra not 72 at 233 C-G. 
119 S v Singo supra note 72 at 773D-E. 
120 S v Nomakhlala (note 100 above). 
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Grosskopf JA,121 in his judgment stated that, “X by refusing to stab the deceased clearly 
indicated that he wanted no part in the attack on the deceased”. Initially X appeal against 






3.1. S v Thebus and Another 2003 (2) SACR 319 (CC) 
For the purpose of this dissertation, the Thebus case warrants a separate discussion 
because that is where the scathing criticism of the doctrine of common purpose were first 
laid down before the court. 
3.1.1 Facts 
The facts of the case were as follows: on 1 September 2000 the two appellants in this 
case were convicted in the High Court on one count of murder and two counts of 
attempted murder.122 On 14 November 1998 a crowd of protesting residents in Ocean 
View‚ Cape Town‚ assembled and approached the houses of several reputed drug 
dealers in the area‚ and allegedly caused damage to property. The protesters had driven 
through the area in a motorcade of about five to six vehicles. As the motorcade 
approached an intersection the drug dealer fired towards the group. In response some 
members of the crowd alighted from their vehicles and returned fire. As a result of the 
crossfire‚ a young girl (aged 7) was killed and two others were wounded.123 
The trial court found that both appellants had been part of the protesting group and were 
present at the scene of the shooting. Applying the common purpose doctrine‚ Mitchel AJ 
                                                          
121 S v Nomakhlala supra 100 at 304 C-D. 
122 S v Thebus supra note 3 at para 1. 
123  Para 1 and 2. 
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found both appellants guilty of one count of murder and two counts of attempted murder. 
Both appellants were sentenced 8years imprisonment‚ suspended for a period of 5 years 
on certain condition. The appellants were also granted leave to appeal against their 
conviction and the State leave to appeal against their sentences.124 
In May 2002‚ the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) heard both appeals. The majority of 
the SCA dismissed the appeal against the convictions and upheld the appeal of the State 
against the sentences. The SCA ordered that each of the sentence imposed by the High 
Court be replaced by a sentence of 15years imprisonment. The appellants further made 
an application for special leave to appeal to the Constitutional Court against the judgment 
and order of the SCA. The appellants were thereafter‚ granted leave to appeal by the 
Constitutional Court on two constitutional issues.125 
3.1.2 The issues 
The Constitutional Court was asked to decide two substantive constitutional issues. The 
first issue was whether, the Supreme Court of Appeal failed to develop the common law 
doctrine of common purpose in conformity with the Constitution‚ as required by section 
39(2)126 and thereby failed to give effect to the appellants rights to dignity,127 freedom of 
the person128 and a fair trial,129 which includes the right to be presumed innocent.130 The 
                                                          
124  Para 6 and 7. 
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126 Section 39 (2) states that:  
 
 “When interpreting any legislation‚ and when developing the common law or customary law‚ every court‚              
tribunal or forum must promote the spirit‚ purport and objects of the Bill of Rights”. 
 
127 Section 10 guarantees that “[e]veryone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and 
protected”.  
128 Section 12(1)(a) states that: 
 
“Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person which includes the right…not to be deprived of 
freedom arbitrarily or without just cause”. 
 
129 Section 35(3) states that “[e]very accused person has the right to fair trial”. 
 
130 Section 35(3)(h) guarantees that: 
“[e]very accused person has a right to fair trial‚ which includes the right… to be presumed innocent‚ to remain 




second issue is whether the negative inference drawn from the first appellant’s failure to 
disclose his alibi defence before trial has infringed his right to silence.131 For the purpose 
of this dissertation only the first issue will be discussed. 
3.1.3 Arguments  
Doctrine of common purpose  
The appellants’ argued that the common purpose doctrine is unconstitutional in its 
entirety. The appellants further submitted that the High Court and the Supreme Court of 
Appeal erred in failing to develop‚ apply and elucidate the following requirements that: 
"(a) there must be a causal connection between the actions of the appellants and the crime for which they 
were convicted; 
(b) the appellants must have actively associated themselves with the unlawful conduct of those who actually 
committed the crime; and 
(c) the appellants must have had the subjective foresight that others in the group would commit the 
crime”.132 
Responding to the foregoing argument‚ the State argued that when the Court is faced 
with the task of developing the common law, the Court is obliged to promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bills of Rights.  The need to develop the common law may arise 
in at least two instance: first ,would be when a rule of common law is inconsistent with a 
constitutional provision and second, where though not inconsistent with a specific 
constitutional provision‚ the common law may fall short of its spirit‚ purport and objects.133 
The appellants further argued that the common purpose doctrine hinders the fundamental 
dignity of each convicted person of the same crime with others because it de-
individualises him or her.134 The appellants claimed further that common purpose doctrine 
violates their right not to be deprived of freedom arbitrary.135 The court held that it was 
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unable to agree that the doctrine encroaches the right to dignity and freedom as it is 
misleading to argue that the prosecution and conviction of an individual de-humanises 
him or her.136 
Causation 
The appellants argued that the common purpose doctrine does not require a causal 
connection between their actions and the crimes of which they had been convicted. They 
urged the Constitutional Court to develop the common law by requiring that the action of 
the accused must be shown to facilitate the offence at some stage and such facilitation 
would occur when the act of the accused is a contributing element to the criminal 
outcome.  This argument, the Constitutional Court concluded did not constitute a direct 
challenge to the principles set out in S v Mgedezi.137 
Active association  
The appellants’ argument against the common purpose doctrine was echoed by the two 
principal criticisms against the doctrine by certain authors. The first criticism was that in 
some cases the component of active association had been cast too widely or misapplied. 
The second criticism was that there are less invasive forms of criminal liability short of 
convicting a participant in the common design as a principal.138 The State in response, 
argued that the foregoing criticisms did not render unconstitutional the liability 
requirement of active association but rather the requirement of active association requires 
that every trial court when applying the common purpose doctrine should evaluate the 
evidence against each accused person with caution.139 
Presumption of innocence  
The appellants’ argued  further that their conviction under the common purpose doctrine 
deprived them the right to be presumed innocent as it exempts the State the burden of 
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proving individual causation in joint criminal enterprises.140 In response, the State argued 
that the common purpose doctrine does not relate to a reverse onus or presumption which 
exempts the prosecution of any part of the burden.141 
 
3.1.4 Findings of the Constitutional Court 
On the issue regarding the doctrine of common purpose the court held that the common 
purpose doctrine did not amount to an arbitrary deprivation of freedom and stated that the 
doctrine was theoretically connected to the legitimate objective of limiting and controlling 
joint criminal ventures. “Group misdemeanour strike more harshly at the fabric of society 
and the rights of victims than crimes perpetrated by individuals”.142 The Court 
acknowledged that in practice‚ joint criminal conduct frequently poses difficulties of proof 
of individual causation, while such difficulties hardly emerge in cases of individual 
accused person. Consequently‚ the Court did not object this norm of culpability even 
though it waives the requirement of causation.143 
 
Responding to the issue regarding causation the court held that in terms of the South 
African law‚ a causal connection between the conduct of an accused and the criminal 
outcome is a prerequisite for criminal liability. The doctrine of common purpose‚ on the 
other hand‚ waives the causation requirement provided the accused actively associated 
with the actions of the perpetrators in the joint venture that caused the death and had the 
necessary intention in respect of the unlawful consequence, the accused would be guilty 
of the offence.144 The primary objectives of the common purpose doctrine‚ is to criminalise  
group misdemeanour and to satisfy the need to diminish crime committed in the course 
of joint unlawful ventures.145  
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The court held further that:  
“The phenomenon of serious crimes committed by collect individuals‚ acting in concert, remains a 
significant societal scourge. It is often difficult in consequence crimes to prove that the act of each 
person or of a particular person in the group contributed causally to the criminal outcome. The 
requirement of such a causal connection for liability would render nugatory and ineffectual the 
object of the criminal norm of common purpose and would make the prosecution of joint criminal 
enterprise intractable and ineffectual”.146 
The courts findings on the issue of dignity and freedom was based on sections 35 and 
12(1) of the Bills of Rights which authorised and anticipated prosecution‚ conviction and 
punishment of persons provided it occurs with the framework of a procedurally and 
substantively fair trial and a permissible degree of criminal culpability. The court held 
further that the common minimum requirements of common law crimes are proof of 
unlawful conduct‚ criminal capacity and fault‚ all of which must be present at the time the 
crime is committed. The court further held that the requirement of a causal connection is 
not definitional element of every crime. Thus‚ in terms of the common law‚ mere exclusion 
of causation as a requirement of liability is not fatal to the criminal norm.147 There are no 
pre-ordained characteristics of criminal actions‚ outcome or condition. “Conduct 
constitutes a crime because the law declares it so”. Constitutionally, any crime whether 
common law or legislative in origin must be constitutionally compliant. Thus‚ to be 
constitutionally compliant‚ the criminal norm may not unjustifiably limit any of the rights or 
offend constitutional principles‚ and may not deprive a person of his or her freedom 
arbitrarily or without “just cause”. This means that people are protected from being 
deprived of their freedom arbitrarily or without an adequate or acceptable reason and to 
the procedural right to a fair trial.148 
On the issue regarding presumption of innocence, the court held that the common 
purpose doctrine neither places an onus upon the accused nor does it presume his or her 
guilt.149 The prosecution has the duty to prove beyond a reasonable doubt all the elements 
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of the crime charged under common purpose. The court stated further that when the 
common purpose is properly applied‚ there is no reasonable possibility that an accused 
person could be convicted despite the existence of a reasonable doubt of their guilt. The 
doctrine‚ in the Courts views does not encroach the right to be presumed innocent.150 
Lastly on the issue regarding active association the court held that “collective approach 
to determining the actual conduct or active association of an individual accused has many 
evidentiary pitfalls”.151 The court held further that the trial court had the duty to determine 
in respect of each accused person‚ “the location ‚ timing‚ sequence ‚duration ‚frequency 
and nature of the conduct alleged” and the factual context of each case will determine 









Criticism of the common purpose doctrine 
 
4.1. Summary of arguments and Remarks.  
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The application of the doctrine of common purpose has not been without controversy over 
all the jurisdictions where it has been applied and has been causing so much discord in 
the South African legal system.153 Despite the doctrine having passed constitutional 
muster, it has evoked severe criticisms from academics such as Burchell,154 Grant,155 
Rabie156 and Boister.157 It is against these criticisms that my dissertation is particularly 
against. 
It has been argued that the common purpose doctrine both in its prior agreement and its 
active association form, which exempts the State in consequence crimes from proving 
individual causation contradicts the fundamental rule that the prosecution has the duty to 
prove beyond any reasonable doubt the elements of liability of  the crime in question, and 
therefore it is an encroachment of the presumption of innocence.158 
The question which arises from the foregoing, is whether in cases were the State cannot 
prove individual causation of each participant in the common purpose beyond reasonable 
doubt but active association and intention is proved. For instance, in mob justice murder, 
should the perpetrators of the crime escape liability because the prosecution could not 
prove whose actions contributed causally to the death of the deceased while clearly there 
is a murder case? 
It is imperative to note that the primary objective of the common purpose doctrine is to 
facilitate convictions of crimes committed by multiple persons and to control crimes 
committed in the course of joint ventures.159 In consequences crimes, such as mob justice 
murder cases, it would be difficult if not impossible to establish individual causation of 
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each person in the common purpose or joint unlawful enterprise.160 Requiring a causal 
connection between the accused and the criminal outcome would render the objective of 
the common purpose doctrine ineffective and make prosecution of collective criminal 
enterprises ungovernable.161 
One of the requirements for criminal liability in terms of the South African law is that there 
should be a causal link between the accused’s conduct and the criminal outcome.162 Take 
for instance, if a group of about 100 people assemble and commit a riot‚ and it thus 
happens that during the riot a victim who is believed to have been breaking into people’s 
homes and stealing is attacked by the mob. Some striking him with fists and others 
severally assaulting him until he is unconscious and while he is still unconscious one of 
the member’s in the mob douses petrol over him, set him alight and left to die. 
In such circumstances‚ nobody is probable to voluntarily concede guilt. Some may even 
plead that the mental impacts of being in a crowd influenced their observation.163 Having 
to prove individual causation in such a case involving a group of 100 people would be 
troublesome if not impossible to prove. Thus, the justification of the use of the common 
purpose doctrine in this regard is justifiable, because in this instance it will be difficult for 
the State to prove individual causation of each accused in the mob violence as it is often 
unclear whose actions in the mob contributed causally to the death of the victim. 164  
Furthermore, absent the doctrine of common purpose would mean that even if there were 
eyewitnesses at the scene of the crime who willingly assist the State to identify the 
perpetrators of the crime, it would not be sufficient for the court to convict the perpetrators. 
Reason being, the prosecution would not be able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that 
that specific accused person’s actions contributed causally to the criminal outcome.165 
Thus, from the foregoing it is argued that it is justifiable that the prosecution in 
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consequence crimes committed by a collective is relieved from proving individual 
causation.166 
In mob violence attacks the criminal outcome is probable to be murder. Absent the 
doctrine of common purpose all the participants would escape liability.167 Therefore, the 
rationale for the common purpose doctrine is to attempt to deal with troublesome 
situations involving the proving of causation in consequence crimes168 and its aim is not 
to encroach any rights of an accused person but rather to ensure that justice is served 
and to limit crimes committed in the course of a joint enterprises.169 
According to Lord Steyn in Regina v Powell: 
“[T]he law has a particular hostility of criminal groups. The rationale is partly one of dangerousness: 
experience has shown that joint criminal enterprises are only to readily escalate into the 
commission of greater offence. Criminal associations are dangerous. They present a threat to 
public safety than ordinary criminal prohibitions, addressed to individual actors, do not entirely 
address. Moreover, the danger is not just an immediate physical nature. A group is a form of 
society, and a group constituted by a joint unlawful enterprise is a form of society that has itself 
against the law and order of society at large”.170 
Murder is one of the serious crimes in South Africa, crimes perpetrated by collective 
individuals acting in concert have a greater impact on the society. This is not suggesting 
that, crimes perpetrated by individuals are less serious, but collective crimes are difficult 
to solve. Their difficulty usually lies in having to prove the element of causation of each 
individual in the joint enterprise.171 
Further, on the issue of encroachment of the “presumption of innocence”,172 the 
Constitutional Court in Thebus held that the common purpose doctrine did not relate to a 
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reverse onus or presumption which exempts the prosecution of any part of the burden. 
The State has the duty to prove beyond any reasonable doubt all the elements of the 
crime charged under common purpose.173 In other words, although the prosecution is 
exempt from proving individual causation in consequence crimes when the common 
purpose doctrine is applied,  the prosecution still has the duty to establish beyond 
reasonable doubt that the participants in the common purpose all agreed to commit a 
crime or actively associated themselves with the commission of the crime by one of their 
member in the common cause with the requisite fault element (mens rea).174 Once that 
is proved, then the actions of that one participant in the group who brought about the 
criminal outcome will be imputed to the other participants in the common purpose.175  
In short, the prosecution is relieved from proving individual causation of each participant 
in consequence crimes but it is not relieved from proving that at least one of the members 
in the common cause brought about the criminal result. Therefore, the argument that the 
doctrine infringes the accused right to be presumed innocent should not stand because 
the doctrine does not shift the onus of proof to the accused person. The State, even 
though the doctrine is applied, is still required to prove the elements of the crime in 
question.176 Furthermore, it is essential to note that where the common purpose doctrine 
is applied  properly, there is no reasonable possibility that an accused person could be 
convicted despite the existence of a reasonable doubt of their guilt.177 
It is further argued that the “Law should stop pretending that people do what they did not 
do”.178 In other words, in consequence crimes the law should not impute liability to the 
other remote members in the common purpose who did not contribute causally to the 
criminal outcome.179 It is also argued that there are competent verdicts such as 
conspiracy, public violence, incitement, accomplice liability and attempt which the courts 
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could apply which are reflections of what the participants in the common purpose did 
rather than imputing liability.180 
What is suggested above will not prevail in a case of mob justice murder. In such 
circumstances having to convict the participants of a competent verdict of public violence 
for instance will not be proportional to the crime in question. It is imperative to note that 
in mob attacks usually the participants would be in possession of the fault element (mens 
rea) and the active association requirement. Therefore, for this reason the participants in 
the mob violence should continue to be regarded as perpetrators or co-perpetrators of 
the crime in question.  
It should be noted that where the criminal outcome is murder, competent verdicts such 
as the ones suggested above are not likely to have the desired detrimental effect as the 
conviction of murder. The application of the common purpose doctrine is not limited to 
murder cases but its application has been extended to the following crimes‚ robbery‚ 
treason‚ public violence‚ assault and house breaking cases.181 However‚ it should be 
noted that the doctrine is frequently applied in murder cases.182  “A crime like murder 
carries a stigma greater than a conviction on an alternative charge or competent verdict 
such as public violence‚ conspiracy‚ incitement‚ attempt and accomplice liability”.183 
In mob justice attacks‚ the criminal outcome is probable to be murder. A conviction of a 
competent verdict in such cases would not have the same desired impediment impact as 
the conviction of murder would have. This is because these competent verdicts are not 
proportional or on the same scale with the conviction of murder. Subsequently, it is 
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submitted that the competent verdicts recommended ought not be received ‚particularly 
in collaborative crimes where the criminal outcome is likely to be murder. 
In S v Makwanyane184  the court held that “proportionality is an ingredient to be taken into 
account in deciding whether a penalty is cruel, inhuman or degrading”. It is therefore 
argued that every punishment should fit the crime.185 For example, in a mob attack the 
criminal result is probable to be murder, having to convict the participants of public 
violence in the absence of proof of individual causation in this event will not be based on 
the  principle of proportionality and will not have the desired deterrent effect. 
It is further argued that the common purpose rule treats a particular category of accused 
person unequally in contrast to accused persons who are charged with committing 
consequence crimes but who are not engaged in a common purpose.186 For instance, in 
cases where the common purpose rule is applied (particularly in collective crimes) the 
prosecution is not required to prove the causation element while in ordinary crimes 
perpetrated by an individual all the requirements for liability must be met.187  It is essential 
to note that the common purpose doctrine does not fit to every wrong doing and thus in 
certain cases the doctrine will not be pertinent.188 The common purpose doctrine is tailor 
made and as a result the courts are segregating in its application.189 
Crimes committed by a group are likely to have a great impact on the society than crimes 
perpetrated by an individual.190 Thus‚ it is a reasonable justification that the common 
purpose doctrine applies in special cases ( such as mob justice murder cases) and should 
not apply to crimes perpetrated by an individual, because causation can be easily 
established in those cases. 
It is respectfully submitted that it is a reasonable and justifiable infringement of the 
accused person’s rights. A submission is further made that the limitation that the common 
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purpose doctrine does not apply to every crime is reasonable and justifiable.191 Reason 
being, the component of causation can be easily established in crimes perpetrated by an 
individual ‚while determining causation in collaborative crimes normally poses challenges‚ 
thus it is reasonable that this special doctrine be applied in special cases in order to 
control crime.192 
It is argued further that it may be appropriate to consider a participant in common purpose, 
particularly one who plays a relatively minor part in the execution of the crime , to be 
regarded as an accomplice rather than a co-perpetrator.193 From the foregoing, it appears 
that another form of liability was suggested, namely accomplice liability.194 An accomplice 
is regarded as someone who does not comply with all the requirements of the definition 
of the relevant crime195 but however he is also punishable even when these requirements 
are not met‚ if he lawfully and intentionally furthers a crime committed by somebody else. 
For instance, by giving advice to the latter‚ facilitating‚ aiding  or encouraging the 
commission of the crime.196  
To what extent will a person’s actions in a “mob justice” murder case be regarded as a 
relatively minor role? Take for instance, if in a mob attack one of the participants strikes 
the victim with his fists and the other participant in the common cause strikes the victim 
with stones, whose actions in this circumstances will be regarded as minor? While 
certainly both actions have an effect of contributing to the victim’s death.   
What might constitute a minor role in one case (or example murder) might not constitute 
a minor role in another case (such as robbery). What barometer will be used to determine 
which accused person’s actions constitute a minor role? Accordingly, it is the concept of 
accomplice liability under mob justice murder cases that I am against on the basis that 
Burchell failed to set out the extent in which a person’s actions will be regarded as a minor 
part. Thus, it is submitted that there should be prerequisites laid down to determine the 
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extent in which a person’s role in the commission of the crime will be regarded as a minor 
part.  It is therefore respectfully submitted that the concept of accomplice liability in joint 
unlawful enterprises should not be adopted because in those circumstances nobody is 
probable to admit guilt. Therefore, we should rather continue regarding accused persons 
in joint criminal enterprises as perpetrators or co-perpetrators. 
It was further argued that “it would have been better for the Constitutional Court in Thebus 
to have heeded the academic criticism of the application of the doctrine in both the 
Safatsa (Sharpeville Six) and Nzo’s cases and declare invalid at least the ‘active 
association’ form of common –purpose criminal liability”.197 The common purpose 
doctrine is probable to be applied in its active association form.198 In mob justice attacks 
liability would usually arise in its active association form ‚ because it usually occurs at a 
spur of a moment‚ where people would join in the crowd during the mob violence without 
having consented either expressly or implied. Therefore, removing the active association 
form under the common purpose doctrine would affect the convictions of such participants 
in mob justice attacks or joint unlawful ventures. 
Furthermore‚ the active association form of the doctrine assists the prosecution facilitate 
convictions of multiple persons involved in the execution of joint unlawful enterprise even 
in cases where prior agreement cannot be established.199 Therefore, the concept of active 
association is the only source of hope the prosecution relies on frequently in collaborative 
crimes. Removing the active association form of the doctrine will endanger our criminal 
justice system and will result in participants in joint unlawful enterprises to escape 
liability.200 
Lastly‚ it was argued that the concept of active association is inherently vague and might 
fail the standards of reasonable clarity envisaged by the fundamental principle of 
legality.201 The restrictive meaning of active association is set out by the four requirements 
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for liability under common purpose as formulated in S v Mgedezi.202 It is trite law that in 
the absence of proof of prior agreement under the common purpose doctrine an accused 
may still be found guilty on the basis of his active association.203 Furthermore the court in 
Thebus held that the criticism that “the requirement of active association has been cast 
too widely or misapplied did not render unconstitutional the liability requirement of active 
association”.204 It is submitted that if these requirements of active association are applied 
because collaborative approach to determining the actual actions or active association of 
an accused person has evidentiary pitfalls then the court was correct in declaring the 











The common purpose doctrine is and has always been a useful instrument in the South 
African criminal courts.206 The doctrine makes it possible for the court to convict a group 
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of people acting in concert where individual causation is elusive to prove, rather than 
allowing the perpetrators of the crime to escape liability.207 Although the doctrine has 
evoked severe criticisms in the way it is applied, it is submitted that, should the doctrine 
be discarded it would impact the number of convictions of crimes committed by collectives 
individuals acting in concert.208 
Crimes committed by a mob or a collective crimes are usually elusive to solve, the 
problem usually lies in the component of causation.209 For instance, if the State is faced 
with a case of murder involving a crowd of about 100 people, in this circumstances absent 
the common purpose doctrine the State will have to prove individual causation of each 
accused, which will be elusive if not impossible to solve and thus the application of the 
doctrine in this instances can be justifiable.210 
The common purpose doctrine is essential to the eradication of crimes committed in the 
course of a joint unlawful enterprise and to diminish the quest of violent crimes in our 
society.211 Furthermore, it is argued that waiving the causation component in special 
cases involving crimes committed by a group of persons is a reasonable infringement of 
the accused person’s rights.212 The doctrine is the primary instrument frequently used by 
the prosecution when challenged with crimes committed in a course of a joint unlawful 
enterprise. Why should we then take away the only source of hope the prosecution 
frequently relies on when challenged with crimes perpetrated by collective individuals 
acting in concert? Although the  common purpose doctrine was used and abused under 
apartheid and so was almost our entire criminal justice system.213 “Which then does not 
make common purpose apartheid law or outdated particularly when it continues to be 
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applied in the dawn of our new democracy and is relied on by our criminal courts on a 
daily basis in almost every case where multiple of accused persons are on trial”.214 
Henceforth, it is respectfully submitted that the doctrine both in its prior agreement and 
active association form should not be discarded and the competent verdicts suggested 
above under the common purpose doctrine ought not be received, particularly in “mob 
justice” murder cases.  
In conclusion, the common purpose doctrine in murder cases does not need to be further 
developed in terms of section 39(2) as it has been found to be constitutional, furthermore 
it does not encroach the accused rights to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and 
nor does it place the onus of proof on the accused, it is the State duty to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt the accused guilt.215 Therefore, the doctrine should continue to be 
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